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and cultural-to making this a reality? In answering these questions, the author evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of the organizations that might serve as models for embassy level COIN operations. This study concludes by proposing a few simple measures that could serve as first steps to making this a reality.
The Long War has been mischaracterized as a War on Terror. Although terror is the preferred method of attack employed by our enemies, the actual target of our efforts is the radical
Islamists that push strict adherence to their distorted interpretation of Islamic law (Sharia).
These radicals-such as Al Qaeda, Jamah Islamiah, and Abu Sayaf Group-seek the establishment of a theocratic world order based on their misguided enforcement of Sharia. Therefore, the War For the purposes of this discussion, "synergize" means to capitalize on the talents of all participants of an operation such that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Within these definitions, the first step into exploring what is the best way for the U.S. to synergize IW efforts at the Embassy is to look at some causal factors of interagency friction.
The problem of an interagency approach to IW at the embassy level is multidimensional.
It consists of complex planning apparatuses, bureaucratic agency fiefdoms, legitimate legal separations of roles responsibilities, and congressional funding delineations. One of the primary sources of friction within the interagency is a common vision on the levels of war.
Levels of War
The American position of limiting military authority and mandating civilian oversight is deeply engrained in our society and any infringement on the part of the military usually draws extreme scrutiny and discouragement. The military has traditionally planned for conflict at three levels: 1) Strategic, 2) Operational, 3) Tactical. Of late, other non DoD agencies have started to look at conflict and plan at five levels: 1) Policy (POL-MIL), 2)Strategic (Agency), 3)
Operational, 4) Mission-level "Whole of Government", 5) Tactical. 3 Since these two planning constructs don't necessarily correlate at exact points, where to plug in the appropriate subject matter expertise is a significant source of friction. This disjuncture is where the military's operational and tactical levels mesh with the other governmental organization's (OGO)
organizational, mission-whole of government, and tactical levels. Depending on the scope of the operation, a SOF planner may have interfaced with another organization's planners well in advance of the event, or may have only interfaced with the Defense Attaché (DAT) for that embassy. This highlights an important takeaway in that the scope and scale of an operation has a direct effect on the amount of interface a SOF package will have during the planning and execution phases of an operation. The larger the scale, scope, and persistence of the threat (i.e., Afghanistan and Iraq), the more intensive the coordination between SOF and the other agency members.
Another source of friction is intelligence and information sharing. 4 The ability to develop a common operational picture for all participants with integrated sourcing and dissemination of information and intelligence has proven a major obstacle. 
Insurgencies & COIN
First, every insurgency is unique and context is everything when assessing a potential insurgent environment. 5 A cookie cutter approach to insurgent warfare will not work.
Intelligence, specifically human intelligence (HUMINT), is critical to effective COIN operations. coerced into no longer supporting the legal government. Now the legal government is in a full blown insurgency. The support of the populous becomes the main struggle. Because of the focus on the struggle for the support of the people, insurgencies are fought at the grass roots level. The center of gravity, for both sides, is the people. It's the 10-80-10 rule; 10% of the people are the insurgents, 10% are loyal to the government, it's the 80% middle populous that must be won over in order to break an insurgency. Two truths have emerged in reference to the US whole of government approach to COIN operations. First, it's the people stupid. 8 Secondly, "We cannot kill our way to victory." 9 The first statement clearly affirms that the focus is on the people, but that does not mean that all USG operations directly target the people. However, it does imply that a unity of effort from all entities within COIN operations is directed towards gaining the peoples trust and support in the legal government's rule of law, belief in its economy's strength, and ability to provide services and security. These efforts, in a post conflict environment, have been woven into the USG's security, stabilization, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) framework. First, for any COIN operation to be successful it must be through, by and with the host nation's government. That said, the entire goal of COIN is to gain/regain popular confidence in the legal government. All efforts must have the host nation's face on them. General David Petraeus, CDR USCENTCOM, has been quoted stating that it is far better to have a host nation to do something tolerably is normally better than external forces doing it well. 11 It does little good to have elections in Iraq if all the polls are guarded by foreigners. It does little good to provide food to hungry villages if the bags are delivered by a heavily armored convoy of foreign uniformed occupiers. The local authorities (not warlords and bullies) must be the ones providing the governance, services and security; not the occupier. In these cases, the military face detracts from the strategic COIN operation and can actually impede or reverse your desired end state.
However, a whole of government effort, coordinated by the State Department's embassy country team, staffed by an appropriate mix of interagency professionals and DoD SOF, can effectively execute support for COIN operations without compromising host nation stature.
Imagine a humanitarian outreach mission in an "at risk" Muslim country. The effort is funded and logistically supported an S/CRS initiative, security provided by host nation and SOF forces, and medical assistance provided by the International Red Crescent working with host nation . By leveraging all IOP's to help put the host nation face on the operation (while keeping U.S. agents in the background) the operation is executed smoothly, the host nation garners more support from its people, and the U.S. build's trust with the host nation that we are indeed a friend in the region. The operations are much more operational art than design, and the interagency relationships are loosely framed by numerous guiding laws and directives throughout the U.S. Many efforts have been made and initiatives launched to codify the relationships between the myriad of organizations that contribute to an effective National Strategic campaign. In the early years, USG organizations sought to cohabitate in a shared environment. Little was done to link organizational capabilities and resources to a jointly agreed upon end state. The quotation in the foundational document cited above, is followed by some general sets of guidelines for the military commander. It is clear that the State department is to be consulted with prior to a military engagement. The principles state that the military commander should use the embassy's expertise in the AOR in developing the military strategy. 1 The implication is that the State department will be used by the military in a supporting role. This implies that the military has taken control of the strategic mission much like the Joint Task Force (JTF) model discussed later in Part 4 of this paper. The infighting and stove piping not only within the DoD, but the U.S.
Part 2

Laws and Directives
government as a whole, led to inefficiencies and ineffectiveness that the American taxpayer was no longer willing to bear.
Law
Since the failure of "Desert One" and the military's performance in Grenada, the signing into law of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols act drove American leaders to find ways to capitalize on the wealth of talent resident throughout all branches of the DoD. The current interagency process in prosecuting IW with non-state militants is a framework of supporting agencies coordinated by a lead entity-usually the Department of State. There have been numerous guidelines published by the U.S. government's executive leadership to prod interagency collaboration and integrated planning along.
Goldwater-Nichols
The Goldwater-Nichols Act spawned a complete overhaul of DoD structure and realigned the service chiefs, functional and geographic combatant commands (COCOM's) to provide a better unity of effort. Service chiefs were now responsible for organizing, training, and equipping forces to be presented to the COCOM's to fight within their respective areas of responsibility (AOR). 2 This act established statutory responsibilities that enhance the strategy-to task links between US National Security Strategy (ends), joint strategic and operational planning and execution (ways), and defense-wide requirements, budget, and programs (means). Agencies will be important to reach many U.S. objectives." 12 This is another piece of guidance that wants its cake and to eat it too. The "other federal agencies" may or may not want the military's personnel "integrated" into their operations. These other agencies have a vote in the interagency as well and the author was unable to find a QDR equivalent on their end.
Analysis
Goldwater-Nichols is the gold standard for congressional guidance. It provided structure and accountability. Organizations knew what was expected and when it was to be delivered. By connecting ends, ways, and means, Goldwater-Nichols was able to produce unprecedented unity of command. PDD-56 was a good start, but it lacked real structure and enforcement mechanisms, so it just drifted to the wayside. NSPD-1 provided clear structure for National Security Council organization, but left the interagency to PCC working groups. NSPD-1 identified the State Department as the lead agent for stabilization and reconstruction efforts, but didn't give it the authority to compel other agencies cooperation. NSPD-44 sufficiently muddled the waters by stating in its closing paragraph, "In addition, this Directive is not intended to, and does not (1) National Security Strategy update to the national press club after meeting with Secretary of Defense Gates and President Obama. He also recognized the need for assistance across a broad group of requirements, not just military, to assist in moving coalition efforts forward in a positive direction. It is clear that the DoD is looking to the interagency and a collaborative effort writ large to address the COIN operation in Afghanistan. This section looks some of the actors that contribute to the US interagency planning and execution framework in confronting IW at the embassy level.
State Department
The Department of State (DoS) is the President's eyes, ears, and mouth around the world with regard to Foreign Policy. To this end, the DoS expended $22.2 billion in 2008 on foreign aid and strategic projects. 1 The DoS only has 11,000 Foreign Service Officers to cover seven geographical regional bureaus, 30 functional and management bureaus, and more than 260 embassies, consulates, and posts around the world. operations, where the rubber meets the road, it's the military that's been paying the bill. All governmental agencies must address the 800 pound gorilla and restructure to meet today's global security threats. These threats are not going away and a whole of government approach is necessary to achieve a better state of peace.
USSOCOM
As the DoD's synchronizer of global IW operations, USSOCOM has service like responsibilities under Title 10, USC, to organize, train, and equip forces. These forces are tasked with numerous missions that are part of Foreign Internal Development (FID), and Internal
Defense and Development (IDAD). They operate by, through, and with indigenous forces to bolster host nation strength. They have unique skill sets like language proficiency, cultural awareness, negotiation and behavior influence. They also bring a wealth of planning expertise, resources, and motivation in addressing politically ambiguous crisis situations where conventional forces would prove counterproductive to the political objectives. They have an incestuous relationship with the intelligence community and habitually operate with DoS entities.
Part 4 Approach Models
Essential though it is, the military action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population.
-David Galula
CORDS Model
Vietnam provided the first backdrop for an attempt at an interagency approach to IW. 
Country Team Model
The most effective means of synergizing US planning and execution capabilities at the tactical level is the embassy country team. While discussing a time tested IW model, MG(ret)
Lambert notes, "This is the US ambassador's interagency country team and its tailored US military component working as an interagency team nearest the problem and closest to the principal actors in the host nation." 7 The embassy country team is composed of the principles from every bureau and agency operating under the embassy's umbrella. When the country team meets (usually on a weekly basis), it is a mandatory event for attendance. As Mrs. Webb conveyed, you'd better be on your death bed if you're not going to be there, and your deputy must attend in your absence. 8 The country team meeting provides the common operating picture for a whole of government approach to planning operations within the Ambassador's purview.
As such, it is the premier forum for interagency dialogue and operational planning for successful strategy to task linkages. 
Persistent SOF Mission Embassy
-Homer Harkins
This paper has shown the breadth and range in perspectives in current literature addressing USG structure and the whole of government approach to COIN operations. The history and often ambiguous nature of strategic guidance (in regards to COIN lead and supporting agency roles) has left the interagency scrambling to define its own frameworks. In scoping the complexity of interagency operations in COIN, there were three avenues to approach an insurgency depending on the size of the operation. The Vietnam CORDS model serves as an outline for current COIN efforts in Afghanistan. The military's JTF model was evaluated as it applied to crisis planning at the GCC areas of responsibility. Finally, the State Department country team approach was assessed as it applied to weak and failing states.
Depending on the frequency of interaction between the interagency and DoD SOF, three approaches are recommended to address how USG interagency professionals and Department of Defense Special Operations Forces can synergize at the Embassy level to better achieve US interests. For the persistent SOF requirement, a dedicated SOF operator needs to be detailed to the embassy country team for full-time planning, coordination, and integration of SOF capabilities. For a habitual SOF relationship with a particular embassy, A SOF LNO (presumably from the GCC TSOC) can serve as adjunct member of the embassy country team as necessary for planning, coordination, and integration of SOF capabilities. For the embassy that infrequently necessitates a SOF capability, a GCC LNO (fully read into the specific program and preferably with a SOF background) can be dispatched to ensure SOF planning, coordination, and integration.
USG will find itself in over the coming decade. Deteriorating economic conditions coupled with transnational, non-state actors spreading ideologies hostile to western values pose the greatest threat to USG interests. Although only one of several models to address this 800 pound gorilla, the recommended country team approaches allow for the greatest level of interagency cooperation at the lowest level of execution. A State Department led, whole of government approach that capitalizes on the capabilities and planning expertise within DOD SOF, is the best framework for evolving USG IW efforts.
